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A B S T R A C T
The article addresses possibilities and barriers to economic activity and develop-
ment in the Oshana region of Northern Namibia. The focus is on the role of local
embeddedness of economic activities in attaining economic development. A network
perspective, based on theories of value chains that are embedded both in social
relations and spatially, is selected as the analytical framework. The value chains of
local black entrepreneurs in the study area are short. Moreover, the analysis
reveals that social obligations may impede economic development, but that such
practices are diminishing. The economic dominance and competition from South
Africa is the main impediment to economic development in Northern Namibia.
Local political embeddedness is shallow and political measures have not signiﬁ-
cantly reduced the implications of this dominance.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The article addresses possibilities and barriers to economic activity and de-
velopment in the Oshana region of Northern Namibia, focusing on the
role of local embeddedness of economic activities in attaining economic de-
velopment. Northern Namibia, formerly Ovamboland, consists of the four
regions of Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana and Oshikoto. Oshana was sel-
ected because the administrative and commercial centres of the North,
Oshakati, Ongwediva and Ondangwa, are located there. The concept local
refers to the geographical area of Oshana and its hinterland.
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A study of possibilities and barriers to economic activity is warranted for
many reasons. The population of Northern Namibia numbers 622,000, or
45% of all Namibia (MTI 1998). The population of the Oshana region
exceeds 190,000 and is projected to reach 222,800 by 2005 (NDC n.d.).
Most of the population is poor in income andmaterial well-being, but while
the population struggles to earn a decent income, economic activities
ﬂourish in the commercial centres.
Domestic and foreign capital, mostly with headquarters in Windhoek
and South Africa respectively, is increasingly aware of the business po-
tential in the North. Pilot interviews in November 1998 revealed that
foreign capital had discovered the local black success stories and was out-
competing formerly successful black enterprises. Likewise, the Regional
Development Plan of the Oshana region 2001/2–2005/6 states that : ‘ local
business people are faced with increased competition from large Namibian
and South African companies expanding their operations to the North
of Namibia ’ (NDC n.d. : 127). The investments of the new entrants are
mainly in trade and services, and there is little manufacturing in the region.
According to a recent study (LaRRI 2001), South African, Lebanese and
Iranian businesses now own most of the warehouses. In addition, South
African chain stores have established a number of retail outlets, and ﬁrms
from China and Botswana dump cheaper goods on the Angola–Namibian
border.
Kennedy (1988: 49) argues that a vigorous local capitalist class should
be promoted in Africa:
Individual foreign companies can never have the same degree of long-term in-
terest in the attainment of higher levels of national development as local business
groups, since they and their families can anticipate fewer direct or permanent
beneﬁts from such advances in the future … overseas ﬁrms cannot be expected to
respond particularly well or gladly to calls for sacriﬁce and change in the pursuit
of national rather than purely personal goals.
His argument leads to the proposition that the economic activities of the
local black entrepreneurs are more locally embedded and thereby con-
tribute more to local economic development than domestic and foreign
capital. This is examined in this paper. A discussion of the contribution of
local black entrepreneurs to local economic development requires com-
parison with the contribution of domestic and foreign enterprises in the
area. It is also necessary to look into how the more successful black en-
trepreneurs tackle the challenge of competition with domestic and foreign
enterprises, compared with the less successful ones. Foreign capital may be
more competitive but less spatially embedded than local black capital. If
foreign capital transfers surpluses out of the study area, local economic
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development has little to gain from it. However, if the more spatially
embedded local black capital is not competitive, this also limits possibilities
for economic development.
The concept of black entrepreneurs is based on Kennedy (1988: 114–5) :
they have become diﬀerentiated from petty production in the following ways :
they are enumerated in government statistics ; employ at least a few permanent
paid workers in addition to kinsmen and apprentices ; the enterprise is conducted
in a legally recognised building-cum-workshop and involves some plant and
equipment, however meagre ; there exists an elementary form of full-time or-
ganisation (the proprietor is not normally directly involved in production) ; the
business is no longer dependent solely on individual clients, but a proportion of
output is sold to other properly constituted enterprises ; and the proprietor strives,
not always very successfully, to reinvest some of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the pursuit of
business expansion.
Black entrepreneurs are involved in a wide range of economic activities
and belong to the formal sector of the economy. The big black en-
trepreneurs in the study area are involved mainly in warehousing and
building supplies, whereas the medium and smaller ones are involved in
activities such as production of furniture and coﬃns, panel beating, and
retail.1 Both big and small entrepreneurs are involved in production and
sales of liquor. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Pendleton et al. (1993),
that the most frequently occurring businesses in the Oshakati–Ondangwa
nexus are general stores, supermarkets and bottle stores. It is also in line
with Kadhikwa et al. (1996) that the most commonly found small en-
terprises in Oshakati and Ondangwa are furniture manufacturers, panel
beaters, spray painters and metal workers. They also mention radio re-
pairers, shoe makers, tailors and welders.
Economic development refers to a process of economic growth and
structural change leading to a diversiﬁed and well-proportioned economy,
where linkages between economic activities ensure that the process is
sustained (Senghaas 1985). The qualitative contents of economic devel-
opment are higher savings and investment in employment-generating
activities (Seers 1972). Employment is important as a means to attain
demand-induced economic growth. Hence, one may also include increas-
ing material welfare of the bulk of the population in the study area as a
dimension of economic development.2
Some manufacturing is required to attain a well-proportioned economy,
and manufacturing is given attention in the analysis due to its potential for
increasing value-added and economic linkage eﬀects. The study area is a
latecomer to economic development, and one cannot expect to ﬁnd the
more advanced and value-generating service activities there. However,
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relatively simple manufacturing activities may become a stepping stone for
more advanced manufacturing and services. Within the manufacturing
sector, the goal is to advance from lower to higher quality activities (Reinert
& Riiser 1994). The latter denotes products for which customers are pre-
pared to pay higher prices. High quality activities are conducive to local
economic development when they result in higher wages for the workers
and thereby increase demand for products manufactured locally.
After the introduction follows a presentation of the analytical framework
and research strategy. A note on the context of competition in Namibia is
followed by an overview of the nature of competition in the study area.
Then the economic activities are analysed in light of their functional,
political, cultural, social and spatial embeddedness in the local economy.
The ﬁndings are in turn examined in light of secondary contextual data in
order to assess prospects for manufacturing and economic development in
the region. The main ﬁndings are summarised in the conclusion, together
with remarks on the usefulness of the analytical framework.
A N A L Y T I C A L F R A M E W O R K
The study objects
The study objects are the value chains and networks of selected local black
entrepreneurs ; domestic capital represented by entrepreneurs from cen-
tral and southern Namibia and enterprises with headquarters in Wind-
hoek; and foreign capital represented by selected chain stores from South
Africa. The point of departure of the analysis is that all economic activities
are embedded in networks that in turn are spatially embedded (Dicken
et al. 1994). Economic activities are part of an input-output structure3 or
value chain that stretches over a geographical area. How much of the
value chain and what speciﬁc economic activities will be located in a given
geographical area, depend on power relations (below) in the networks of
which the economic activities form part (Gereﬃ 1996). Social relations
between actors, i.e. ‘a regular set of contacts or similar social connections
among individuals or groups’ (Swedberg & Granovetter 1992: 9) turn the
value chain into a network. In the following, the concept of economic
networks refers to value chains that are embedded in social, political and
cultural networks.
The embeddedness argument
The embeddedness argument used here has its roots in Granovetter’s
(1985, 1992a, b) criticism of the transaction costs approach in neo-classical
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and new institutional economics. The transaction costs approach focuses
on why ﬁrms either organise production internally, purchase components
and inputs in the open market, or engage in network relationships, i.e.
subcontracting between diﬀerent ﬁrms. The respective forms of organis-
ation reﬂect diﬀerent ways of dealing with the cost of economic trans-
actions. Accordingly, subcontracting in network relationships is considered
intermediate between internal organisation and market orientation.
Granovetter (1992a, b), on the contrary, holds that subcontracting is not
an empirical intermediate between internal organisation of ﬁrms and pure
market relations. He argues that this is because pure market relations
are rare, and personal relations are important in all types of organisation.
One should analyse ‘how behaviour is embedded in concrete, ongoing systems
of social relations ’ (Granovetter 1992b: 9, emphasis added). This does not
mean that economic arguments are excluded from the analysis, but that
one must move beyond economic conditions in explaining industrial or-
ganisation. The point is that : ‘ in identical economic and technical con-
ditions, outcomes may diﬀer dramatically if social structures are diﬀerent ’
(Granovetter 1992b: 9).
The extended concept of networks
The concept of networks applied in the analysis entails more than relations
between single cooperating ﬁrms. Taylor (1994: 102) deﬁnes an enterprise
in a network as ‘one point in a social economic constellation of points
comprising other enterprises and agents ’. Likewise, Gipouloux (2000)
distinguishes between four elements needed to make a network work:
(i) actors, both individuals and organisations, including institutions such as
government agencies and universities ; (ii) activities ; (iii) the core resource
that is exchanged (basically information and technology) ; and (iv) the
binding mechanism. Various types of business agreements and equity
shares are mentioned as examples of binding mechanisms, but in line with
Granovetter (1992a) it is necessary to include social obligations and trust.
Trust may replace business contracts in economic networks.
According to Taylor (1994), the actors in a network are business organ-
isations (including enterprises), regulatory institutions and individuals.
Interaction between some business enterprises is characterised by selling
and buying, an interaction referred to as complementary, although it is
stressed that it is unequal from the point of view of power relations. With
other agents in the network, interaction is competitive or controlling. There
is no direct transaction between competing enterprises, but they are in-
directly aﬀected by each other through their transactions with other agents
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in the network. Governments and unions are examples of controlling
institutions.
The concept of network applied in the analysis implies that the ana-
lytical focus is extended from economic activities per se to the character and
extent of any social relations that are relevant to the actors’ economic ac-
tivities. Transactions that take place in the networks are manifestations of
social relations.4 At the level of personal contacts, social relations give
access to resources to set up and run an enterprise. Contacts include
suppliers, customers, banks and ﬁnance institutions, business experts, in-
dustrial associations (private) and industrial departments (governmental),
family and friends. Moreover, the entrepreneur may be involved in social
relations that result in the channelling of resources out of the value chain
in question and into another, for example when consumption takes place
to the detriment of reinvestment.
Social, political and cultural embeddedness
Zukin & DiMaggio (1990), who have further developed the embeddedness
argument, distinguish between cognitive, social, political and cultural em-
beddedness. For practical reasons, the issue of cognitive embeddedness5 is
not addressed in this study. Social embeddedness refers to the nature of
interpersonal relations, and social networks are understood as personal
contacts between managers, and between these and other actors who are
important to the performance of the economic activity (see Isaksen 1994).
Trust is the glue in these relationships and is understood as ‘conﬁdence
in the continuation of a mutually satisfying relationship’ (Wu Wei-ping
2000: 45).
Cultural embeddedness refers to how collective understanding shapes
economic strategies and goals, and sets limits to economic rationality. Cul-
tural networks comprise relations between the enterprises and the wider
community in which their economic activities are carried out. Common
culture and values in locations where the economic activities take place are
an important source of trust, and also a basis for personal contacts and
favourable political relations (see Isaksen 1994).
Political embeddedness refers to ‘ the manner in which economic in-
stitutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves
economic actors and non-market institutions, particularly the state and
social classes ’ (Zukin & DiMaggio 1990: 20). A case in point is how govern-
mental policies, laws and regulations aﬀect the structure of the market.
Political networks refer to relations to the political elite and regulatory
authorities. The example of bank credit illustrates the diﬀerence between
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social and political embeddedness. If the entrepreneur obtains credit due
to wealthy friends or relatives who provide collateral, or because he is on
good terms with the bank manager, this is an example of social embed-
dedness. The same is the case if individuals get bank loans due to personal
political connections. However, if a black entrepreneur obtains credit due
to a government programme to stimulate economic initiatives among the
black population, this is an example of political embeddedness.
Functional and spatial embeddedness
Spatial embeddedness has two dimensions (Dicken et al. 1994). The ﬁrst
simply means that the economic activity contains something local, just
because it has a speciﬁc geographical location. It refers to how much of the
value chain, i.e. input-output activity, is located in the study area, and thus
to what degree the activity is functionally embedded in the area. The other
dimension is deeper because it takes into account that the economic ac-
tivities are embedded in social, political and cultural networks. Activities
that are functionally embedded in the study area may to a limited extent
be socially, politically and culturally embedded in that area. The character
of local networks is inﬂuenced by relations the actors may have elsewhere.
Moreover, the nature of networks in the local setting is inﬂuenced by
socio-economic processes at the global level. Some networks may actually
be more global than local in orientation. This link between the local and
the global has direct relevance for power relations at the local level.
Power relations
Granovetter (1992a) emphasises that power relations in terms of domi-
nation and subordination cannot be neglected in studies of industrial or-
ganisation; complexities arise even when formally equal parties negotiate,
and many of these are resolved by implicit and explicit power relations
among ﬁrms. Taylor (1994) and Taylor et al. (1995) incorporate space and
place in their power networks approach.6 They build on Clegg (1989), who
distinguishes between three non-hierarchical interacting circuits of power.
The power circuits capture the dynamics of the networks, i.e. how and
why power relations in the network change.
The ﬁrst circuit of power is the circuit of causal power where agency is
the analytical level. Power is based on money and authority and only
exercised episodically. It focuses on the time-speciﬁc and place-speciﬁc
relations between business enterprises, individuals, institutions and govern-
ments. The reason why power is only exercised episodically is that it is in
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the interest of all parties to minimise network disruption and uncertainty,
so as to protect production, consumption and investment.
The second circuit is the circuit of dispositional power. Here power is
dealt with at the analytical level of social integration and the focus is on rules
of practice. This is where rules are ﬁxed and compulsory passage points to
becomemembers of networks are established. The rules and passage points
are time and place speciﬁc, and reﬂect accepted norms of local societies.
Dispositional power is a means to cement existing power relations. How-
ever, agencies may attain power when episodic spells of pressure and re-
sistance in the ﬁrst circuit result in changes in the rules and passage points
of the second circuit. The place-speciﬁc rules and passage points may also
be modiﬁed and changed due to changes in regulations at the domestic
and international levels.
The third circuit is the circuit of facilitative power at the analytical level
of system integration. The focus is on domination. The facilitative circuit
represents an opening for new agents to gain power and become dominant
in the network. This is because innovation in techniques of discipline (for
example, control of labour) and production will empower some agents and
disempower others. Such innovations can occur locally or be a result of
exogenous forces. It is important to note that rules ﬁxed in the dispo-
sitional circuit can both facilitate and restrict such innovations. However,
when such innovations occur, they aﬀect rule ﬁxing and passage points in
the dispositional circuit and standing conditions in the causal circuit. This
power networks approach will be applied in the analysis because it dis-
tinguishes between diﬀerent spatial levels of analysis, and elucidates how
the local and global are interlinked.
In sum, the nature of networks, in terms of power relations, collaboration
and competition, is essential to increasing and sustaining local economic
linkages and the multiplier eﬀects of economic activities. Moreover, activi-
ties performed in the local economy may be more functionally, socially,
politically and culturally embedded in other geographical areas than the
study area. If so, the network has an outward orientation and local em-
beddedness is shallow. In the Namibian case, local black capital, domestic
capital and foreign capital may all be more embedded in other networks
than the local, but to a varying degree. Spatial embeddedness – the nature
and degree of local embeddedness – is a cross-cutting issue in the analysis.
R E S E A R C H S T R A T E G Y
The research strategy adopted is a theoretically informed and qualitative
case study. The primary data was collected in Oshakati, Ongwediva and
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Ondangwa in November 2001. Two key interviews on the general com-
petitive situation were conducted at the Namibia Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (NCCI), Northern Branch, one being a focused group in-
terview with three members and the business advisor. A manager in the
local branch of one of the big banks was also interviewed. As a starting
point, oﬃcial lists of businesses in operation were obtained from the
Northern Electricity Board.7 Ideas about whom it would be useful to meet
in order to cover the various aspects of our research questions were ob-
tained from resource persons in the North and in Windhoek. Interviews
were then carried out with nineteen local black entrepreneurs and ten
investors from outside, i.e. chain stores and entrepreneurs with large,
medium and small enterprises, although not micro-enterprises. The local
entrepreneurs represented diﬀerent types of economic activities, such as
auto repairs and sales of petrol ; building construction; retail in building
materials and auto parts ; printing; sewing; woodwork; funeral services ;
wholesale and retail grocers ; liquor stores and supermarkets. A number of
the entrepreneurs were involved in more than one activity. The sample
encompasses both successful entrepreneurs and those who struggle to
survive, including some who are still trying to keep going, some who have
diverted into other activities while retaining the initial activity, and others
who have closed down the initial activity and shifted to new ones. Whether
entrepreneurs in the two latter categories become successful in the longer
run remains to be seen.
T H E C O N T E X T O F C O M P E T I T I O N I N N A M I B I A
From 1915 to 1990, Namibia was a South African colony. The relationship
was characterised by a classical division of labour, in which South Africa
extracted raw materials from Namibia, and Namibia served as a protected
market for South African manufactures. Northern Namibia was a source
of migrant labour. In the 1950s, ‘ two or three’ local Africans got licences
to run shops taken over from Europeans (Mbuende 1986: 193).
As a result of internal and international pressure after Angolan inde-
pendence in 1975, South Africa shifted from a bantustan (homelands)
policy8 to a policy of internal settlement. The bantustan policy implied
that a homeland was established for each population group. Whereas the
white homeland covered the mineral-rich central plateau and was incor-
porated into South Africa, none of the black homelands were economi-
cally viable. An objective of the internal settlement policy was to promote
a collaborative African bureaucracy and petty bourgeoisie, and in the late
1970s more local black entrepreneurs were permitted to set up businesses
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in the North. However, the federal model of government ensured that de
facto power lay at the level of the bantustan governments. Hence, African
migrant workers could not participate in decision-making in the white
area. There were ‘comparatively few changes to the underlying political
economy or relations of production’ (Simon 1985: 508), and the internal
settlement strategy was criticised as no more than a sophistication of the
homeland strategy (Jauch 1998; Mbuende 1986).
In the 1970s and until the late 1980s, demand for consumer goods in the
North was high, due to the presence of the South African army and a large
number of white inhabitants. During the struggle for liberation, South
African companies were reluctant to settle down in the North. This
changed with independence in 1990. The inﬂux of South African com-
panies increased throughout the 1990s, stimulated by the open economy
and free trade policy pursued by the Namibian government.
Due to the South African colonial policy, manufacturing accounted for
only 5% of GDP at the time of independence in 1990 (Curry & Stoneman
1993; UNIDO 1990). By 1998 it had increased to 12% (UNIDO n.d.). The
government of Namibia rides many horses in its industrial policy (Endresen
& Jauch 2001). Oﬃcial documents reveal that government policy is both to
promote free trade in order to attract foreign investors, and to promote
selected industrial sectors with a comparative advantage in exports. In
addition, there is a policy to stimulate smaller-scale Namibian businesses.
The Foreign Investment Act of 1990 provides for non-discrimination be-
tween local and foreign investors (UNIDO 1994),9 but stated aims of the
1992 White Paper on industrial development are both to ‘ increase manu-
facturing value-added by stimulating productivity, increased exports and
where eﬃcient, import substitution’, and to ‘ increase the participation of
Namibian citizens previously excluded from industrial activities by giving
preferential access to lines of business favouring small-scale activities ’
(ibid. : 21).
In 1995 the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Act was passed. In 1997 the
government promised assistance to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
because such enterprises are important job creators, and stated that export-
led growth was the only viable strategy for sustainable economic devel-
opment and massive job creation (Republic of Namibia 1997). A document
on industrial policy beyond 2000 (MTI 1999) emphasised – in line with a
neoliberal approach – that free trade and trade liberalisation were im-
portant for industrial development, and that intervention should operate
through the market by incentives and information.
The economic strength of South Africa in southern Africa represents
a structural constraint to production in Namibia. In the international
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context, the market in Namibia in general (and Northern Namibia in
particular) is small, and purchasing power is low. Products are imported
from South Africa, where they are manufactured for a bigger southern
African market. As a member of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU), Namibia cannot protect its industry from South African imports,
while imports from countries outside SACU are subject to high tariﬀs.
South Africa is by far the strongest party in SACU. Not only does South
African industry beneﬁt from economies of scale and technological su-
periority vis-a`-vis Namibia, but ﬁrms in nine economic regions in South
Africa are actually subsidised by the Regional Industrial Development
Programme. On top of this, the monopoly situation enables South African
ﬁrms to further strengthen their position by dumping, over-pricing and
restrictive purchasing policies in Namibia (Curry & Stoneman 1993).
Simon (2001) documents the increase in South African outward foreign
investment and trade in the 1990s. Figures from 1997 reveal that Namibia
holds 23% of the direct and non-direct South African assets in eastern and
southern Africa. This is the largest share among the countries in this re-
gion. According to the study, South African companies market themselves
as continental and global players with expertise, experience and resources,
and African host countries tend to welcome South African trade and in-
vestment in order to secure employment and promote production. The
products are cheap and considered appropriate for the local markets.
C O M P E T I T I O N I N T H E N O R T H
The fact that it became easier for local black entrepreneurs to set up
businesses in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the protection from which they
beneﬁted, represented a change in the circuit of facilitative power. Pro-
tection was not part of an economic policy, but an outcome of the struggle
for liberation. A new change in the circuit of facilitative power took place
in the 1990s with the introduction of the free trade policy. How this aﬀects
local black businesses and their power in business relations is addressed in
the following.
The investors in the North are mainly big South African chain stores,
which sell groceries, textiles, garments, electrical consumer goods and fur-
niture, and cater predominantly to the middle-class market. They have a
number of outlets in Namibia and all over Southern Africa. They buy in
bulk from their suppliers and thus obtain economies of scale that enable
them to compete ﬁercely in price cutting, provide a wide range of quality
goods, and retain a comparatively high level of wages for their workers at
the same time. Local big black entrepreneurs cannot negotiate the same
ECONOM I C D E V E LO PM ENT I N NORTH ERN NAM I B I A 565
low level of prices with their South African suppliers (interview). During
the colonial time, South African ﬁrms were known to undercut prices to
prevent local ﬁrms starting production (Sparks & Green 1992). The prac-
tice is still pursued. This can be illustrated by the example of three busi-
nessmen from South Africa who said that they were in the North to
identify successful local undertakings, set up similar businesses, and out-
compete the local ones on price (conversation November 1998). Big
companies, like the South African ones, have suﬃcient resources to run at
a loss for a certain period in order to ensure large market shares and high
proﬁts in the longer run.
It is particularly in groceries and supermarkets that some of the local
black entrepreneurs struggle. Proﬁt margins are about 7–8% in wholesale
and 23% in supermarkets (interview). One local black entrepreneur ex-
plained that he did very well in the 1980s, but had to close down in 1990.
Instead of retail, he now rents out his shop building and has built a block
of ﬂats for rent. Another entrepreneur in the sample also plans to build
ﬂats for rent as a means to diversify. Flats in the area are rented out for
300–350 Namibian dollars (NAD) a month.10 It is diﬃcult to obtain a
higher price, and this is not considered a good return on investment ac-
cording to a respondent in the housing sector. When it comes to clothing,
chain stores that market fashion goods are popular with the young black
population, but local black tailors who make both Western and African
fashion clothes are also successful. The data suggests that the biggest chal-
lenge for the local black entrepreneurs is not the ability to supply the
market with modern products that are in demand, but to do so at a com-
petitive price.
Small and medium-scale entrepreneurs from central and southern
Namibia engage in activities such as subcontracting in building construc-
tion and auto repairs. According to a white entrepreneur, the construction
industry is booming and there is suﬃcient work for all. The expertise of big
foreign companies is required in multimillion projects, but it is diﬃcult for
local black entrepreneurs to make a success as subcontractors in building
construction, because this requires a lot of starting and operating capital.
The problem is reinforced by diﬃculties in getting bank loans and the high
interest rates on such loans (below). These entrepreneurs have outlays on
equipment and material, and are only paid after a substantial part of the
job has been done. One subcontractor in building construction stated that
he was paid on a monthly basis, and only at a given rate per square metre
completed. Hence, delays cause serious economic problems. In addition,
local black entrepreneurs hold that white entrepreneurs have far better
access to bank loans.
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One local black entrepreneur in auto repairs stated that there were few
auto repair shops in the region just after independence. The increase in
economic activities and improved salaries made it possible for more people
to buy cars. The cars are insured and insurance companies encourage
entrepreneurs in the South to set up businesses in the North. Insurance
companies check facilities and the quality of work before they approve
auto repair shops, and both black and white auto repair shops have con-
tracts with insurance companies. However, the local black entrepreneur
claims that his business is declining, while white panel beaters get plenty of
jobs. This is conﬁrmed by a white entrepreneur who gets a lot of work
from insurance companies.
S H A L L O W F U N C T I O N A L E M B E D D E D N E S S
With reference to Kennedy (1988), one may expect local black en-
trepreneurs to have far more input-output linkages with the local economy
than domestic and foreign enterprises. Moreover, it was expected that
local black entrepreneurs would be more likely than domestic and foreign
investors to cater to the poorer niches of the local economy. This should
stimulate generation of local linkages and thereby local embeddedness.
The data did not support this line of argument. The production equip-
ment and inputs used by local black entrepreneurs originate ﬁrst and
foremost from South Africa. This applies to all categories, including
manufacturing, repairs, construction, and wholesale and retail trade. Pur-
chases were made directly from South Africa, or bought from South Africa
via aﬃliates in Windhoek. According to one interviewee, a retailer in auto
spares, there is some tendency to avoid Namibian-based branch oﬃces
and retailers, and import directly from suppliers in South Africa. How-
ever, a white entrepreneur said that although he sometimes buys directly
from South Africa, he buys most of his parts from Windhoek and the local
branch of the Windhoek-based company. Because he buys a lot, he is
entitled to a high rate of discount. He does not rule out purchases from
‘ local guys ’, i.e. small black entrepreneurs. They provide smaller items
such as bull bars and brake drums, and 70–60% of the locally cut engines
are considered to be of good quality.
In the units in the sewing sector, Namibia-based ﬁrms that sell fabrics
from South African and other foreign countries are mostly avoided. In
addition to direct imports from South Africa and purchases from South
African sales representatives who visit the region, local black en-
trepreneurs buy fabrics in Thailand and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). They travel abroad to establish business relations or select
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fabrics in the street markets. When they do not go through acquaintances,
they contact the embassies for addresses of potential suppliers. One
printing shop had recently purchased a new laser printer directly from
Germany. The purchase was made on the Internet, as this was cheaper
than buying it in Windhoek. Another local black entrepreneur found
three of his suppliers on the Internet. More extensive use of the Internet
in future may further by-pass dealers in Windhoek and Southern Africa.
One manufacturer who caters to the lower end of the market prefers
to buy inputs from local shops. He does not ‘believe in’ going to South
Africa for inputs. This could be a result of both the cost of the journey and
his age.
Although local black entrepreneurs have closed down some activities
due to competition, new activities are started and reinvestment take place
locally. White Namibian entrepreneurs who have settled down in the
North also reinvest and expand their business there. In contrast, South
African chain stores are known to repatriate their surpluses. It is also
claimed that some of them disinvest due to the saturation of the market,
which they perceive as declining purchasing power: ‘ they pack their
suitcases, take their money and return (to South Africa) ’ (interview with a
bank manager, parenthesis added). Technically speaking, repatriation of
proﬁts is facilitated by the Common Monetary Union (CMU), also re-
ferred to as the Rand monetary area.11 Namibia got its own currency in
1993, but the South African Rand is legal tender and freely interchange-
able with the Namibian dollar (Sparks & Green 1992; UNIDO 1994).
South African investors in Namibia can deposit money directly into their
home accounts.
The value chains formed by local black entrepreneurs were short or
almost absent in the study area. In other words, the functional embed-
dedness of local black entrepreneurs in the local economy is shallow. In
addition, there are signs that outward orientation is on the increase. This
can be explained by tough competition and the need for cost cutting.
However, in the sewing sector, purchase of fabric abroad is also a strategy
to provide unique and fashionable products. Local black entrepreneurs
are not signiﬁcantly more locally embedded in terms of supplies than
domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Some reinvestment in the
local economy is undertaken by both local black entrepreneurs and
domestic entrepreneurs, while South African chain stores tend to repatri-
ate proﬁts. Only one of these chain stores buys some fruit and vegetables
locally. The shortness of these value chains is in line with the ﬁndings of
Pedersen & McCormick (1999) that indigenous African business systems
are fragmented.
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P O L I T I C A L E M B E D D E D N E S S : ‘T H E G O V E R N M E N T W O N’T L E T T H E
N O R T H F A L L T O P I E C E S ’
Many ruling party members come from the study area, which is strategi-
cally important to attract voters. Special emphasis and measures by the
government to create employment and develop the region economically
may stimulate black economic activities. Does this reﬂect political em-
beddedness which strengthens black business activities? White national
capital can also be promoted by black governments for the purpose of
industrialisation and capital accumulation, as in the case of Zimbabwe
(Nicholas 1994; Ostergaard 1994). Pedersen & McCormick (1999) hold
that declared socialist governments in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia and
Mozambique have been reluctant to promote an indigenous business class
that can compete with them for power.
Political embeddedness in the North manifests itself in the fact that a lot
of public investment takes place there, such as the establishment of a
branch of the University of Namibia (UNAM), establishment of a high
court and expansion of the hospital. A branch of the National Reserve
Bank was due to open in March 2002. A Deeds Oﬃce and the Namibia
Intelligence Service were also due to be established. Oshakati is designated
to become the economic capital of Northern Namibia by 2016 (Urban
Dynamics 2001). The investments are made to facilitate increasing local
governance in line with the decentralisation policy of the government
under the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing.12
According to this policy, a number of functions such as community de-
velopment, primary health care, management of communal lands, and
physical and economic planning will be decentralised to the regional
councils of the thirteen regions of Namibia. However, public investments
such as those in the North are not taking place in the other regions.
The government implements aﬃrmative action to redress the negative
eﬀects of discrimination against blacks during the colonial period. So far,
aﬃrmative action has advanced the fastest in civil service employment. In
the private sector, employers are permitted, but not compelled, to practice
aﬃrmative action ( Jauch 1998).13 The fact that aﬃrmative action has
created fear of reverse discrimination among white males, may represent a
small push towards private sector involvement in the north where they see
that economic activities ﬂourish. According to one white respondent :
‘White people move in, whereas rich blacks move to Windhoek’ and
‘Whites move in because they know that the government won’t let the
North fall to pieces. ’
Government policy may favour the black population in the region, in
the sense that they are the main beneﬁciaries of aﬃrmative action in the
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civil sector. One white respondent claimed that the government pumps in
money in order to compensate for the negative eﬀects of the open market.
However, in practice, the decentralisation policy is of no particular ad-
vantage to local black entrepreneurs who operate in the private sector.
They still lose in the competition with investors and entrepreneurs from
outside. Measures were taken to make it easier for the local people to get
tenders in construction, but according to local business people, this did not
work: ‘However, other brothers (i.e. entrepreneurs from the South) realise
this (that requirements to get tenders are lowered) and sprint in, and they
are the investors. Standards cannot be lowered when qualiﬁed people are
here ’ (interview, parenthesis added). His point is that entrepreneurs from
the South move to the North, and then get the projects because they are
better qualiﬁed.
Moreover, both black and white entrepreneurs in building construction
complain about the performance guarantee of 10% of the costs that the
Namibian government demands on its projects. In contrast, the South
African government demands a guarantee of 10% only on projects ex-
ceeding 10 million Rand. For projects up to a value of 1 million Rand the
latter demands only 1%. The requirement of the Namibian government
makes it diﬃcult for small local enterprises to bid for government tenders
in construction. Hence, in practice such tenders do not really serve as
incentives to boost local black enterprises.
Local black entrepreneurs hold that government tenders tend to go to
big Namibian or South African ﬁrms. Government tenders can only be
given to enterprises that are registered for value added tax (VAT) and
social security. The entrepreneur has to keep accounts, which in turn
requires training, time and paper work. Registration is voluntary for en-
terprises with a turnover of less than NAD 200,000. In order to get a
government tender, the enterprise is not permitted to make use of un-
registered sub-contractors. Tenders are evaluated by a board in Wind-
hoek. The ﬁnal selection is up to the relevant Ministry. The government is
not legally bound to take the lowest oﬀer. One local black entrepreneur
thought that small enterprises have diﬃculties in getting government
tenders because the government fears that they do not possess the infra-
structure to deliver the goods. In one case it took a local black en-
trepreneur about six years to get his ﬁrst tender.
There is frustration among local black entrepreneurs that measures are
not taken to protect them against competition from South African in-
vestors and entrepreneurs from the South. Their argument is that com-
petition takes place on unequal terms. In addition to the economies of
scale of the South African companies, black entrepreneurs have diﬃculties
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in raising capital. At the entrepreneurial level, access to credit is a barrier to
establish, upgrade and expand manufacturing production and other busi-
nesses. The need for credit has been a major concern of black respondents
in a number of studies carried out in Namibia and other African countries
(Kennedy 1988; MTI 1998; Pedersen 2001; Pedersen & McCormick
1999). Banks are reluctant to give loans to black entrepreneurs and interest
rates are high. One big diﬃculty when starting a business is to provide the
required security to obtain loans. Kennedy (1988) also points to the need to
learn how to apply for loans and be able to document expenditure, income
and assets properly. Over time a number of special credit schemes directed
at small enterprises have been launched by the government, which pro-
vides security in the current credit scheme. Applicants are required to sub-
mit a business plan and sit for an interview. The local black entrepreneurs
complain that it is extremely diﬃcult to get such loans and that they are
not informed why their applications are rejected. One bank manager ar-
gued, for his part, that many projects are economically unviable and that
this is partly due to bad advice from business advisors : ‘The people who
make the business plans for the entrepreneurs rip them oﬀ. Those who
make business plans should be experts. ’ Moreover, he claims that en-
trepreneurs can ask for an appointment to know in more detail why their
applications were rejected. However, it is not common to do this, and
entrepreneurs do not know how to proceed after a rejection. Savings are
not always suﬃcient for viable investments and entrepreneurs also need
operating capital.
When security is required, the banks ask for savings and title deeds. It
does not help to have a shop or a nice house as long as you do not have
title deeds to the land. This reﬂects contradictions between the traditional
and the new system of land ownership. Previously traditional leaders sold
permission to occupy land (PTOs) and persons with such land did not
usually have papers to this eﬀect. They are of the opinion that the land is
theirs because they have paid for it, but such land is not accepted as
security by the banks. When Oshakati, Ongwediva and Ondangwaa be-
came metropolitan areas in the late 1990s, the right to the land was trans-
ferred from the government to the respective municipalities. Currently,
the respective municipalities sell land for housing schemes and business
undertakings, and the land values are on the increase. Some of the en-
trepreneurs in the sample have bought such land, but there is also frus-
tration that one has to ‘buy land twice’, and that it is diﬃcult to raise the
money. From the town councils’ perspective, however, income from land
is an important source of revenue to provide infrastructure such as water
and sanitation (Simon 1996).
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Bank savings can be used as security, but black entrepreneurs cannot
borrow much more than they have already saved in the bank. The interest
rate is considered high and some would rather spend their own savings,
which is not uncommon among small entrepreneurs in Africa (Pedersen
2001). In Northern Namibia the banks assess the loan applications and
decide the interest rate on a case-by-case basis according to the risk in-
volved. The minimum interest rate is 14%.
The data do not suggest any signiﬁcant improvement in access to credit
for local black entrepreneurs. In other words, political embeddedness does
not matter much in terms of access to bank loans. Some local black en-
trepreneurs express frustration that it is always diﬃcult for the blacks to
obtain bank loans. They claim that the bankers protect white interests and
cannot make decisions without the consent of the head-oﬃce inWindhoek.
They also claim that local black employees in the banks only serve as
window-dressing. The power resides with white managers in the South to
the beneﬁt of the whites. Having said this, the bank manager holds that
the foreign chain stores bring in their own capital. Hence, they do not out-
compete the local blacks regarding access to credit.
The experience of both the local black entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs
and investors from outside is that the main concern of the government is
the free trade policy, and that this dominates industrial policy. Some local
black entrepreneurs also stressed that the government is informed about
the problems of the local black entrepreneurs but does not do anything
because action would not ﬁt with the free trade policy. This is in contrast
to the ambiguity expressed in the government policy documents noted
above. The Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCCI) ar-
ranges meetings with government oﬃcials and sends letters to explain the
problems of local black entrepreneurs, but meetings with relevant minis-
ters take a long time to arrange and are of little practical help. Any break
with the government’s free trade policy might cause insecurity and resist-
ance among foreign investors, and its inclination is to protect the present
pattern of production, consumption and investment. It is indicative of
business as usual in the circuit of causal power.
This indicates that the political embeddedness of local black en-
trepreneurs is less than expected, and that measures which could have
strengthened their businesses are of limited avail. At the macro level, op-
portunities inherent in the decentralisation policy are diﬃcult to capture for
the local black entrepreneurs, since they have to compete with large
capital-strong companies that are competitive in both price and quality.
There is also frustration about lack of information regarding industrial
policy and regulations at the national and local level. The situation in
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Namibia diﬀers from Zimbabwe, where white national capital has been
actively promoted by the government. Namibia got its independence at the
height of an era when free trade was advocated and promoted inter-
nationally. The problems faced by local black entrepreneurs thus largely
derive from lack of protection in competition with new entrants, especially
from abroad, who have much greater ﬁnancial and technological
resources.
C U L T U R A L E M B E D D E D N E S S: F A C I L I T A T O R A N D I M P E D I M E N T
As noted above, cultural embeddedness refers to how collective under-
standing shapes economic strategies and goals. On the one hand, culture
may set limits to economic rationality. On the other hand, common culture
and understanding of common values in the location where the economic
activities take place, are an important source of trust which in turn can be
important to obtain economic success.
The traditional system of inheritance is not conducive to economic
development in the longer run. As some local black entrepreneurs said:
‘When a business person dies, the enterprise dies with him as the relatives
split the enterprise and share the value between them.’ When the husband
dies, his family and relatives inherit. The rule of descent is matrilineal and,
by tradition, children do not inherit from their father, but are heirs-to-be
of their maternal uncle (Malan 1995). After independence people could
choose between the traditional system and modern law. In the latter case,
they make a will or register as a share company. Wills and shareholding
have become more popular as education has improved.
Some local black entrepreneurs had concrete plans to establish share
companies, not only as a matter of inheritance, but to boost business.
Their objectives were to expand the capital base, make management more
permissive, and increase the knowledge base:
Failure in industry is often a result of poor management. One can overcome this
by forming a group of people with diﬀerent ideas and common goals. One has to
learn from other people’s experience. To get government tenders one has to be
big. It is a matter of raising capital … [and] we are stronger when united [local
black entrepreneur].
An obligation to employ family members in key positions, irrespective of
background and skills, may undermine the growth and development of the
enterprise (Kennedy 1988). This indicates a situation where cultural and
social embeddedness are in conﬂict with economic development. Inter-
estingly, the ﬁndings suggest that attitudes and practice regarding such
social obligations are about to change.
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In the interviews it was agreed that pressure to employ family members
and relatives exists. Many of the local black entrepreneurs in the sample
still employ family or relatives. They have diﬀerent experiences with it, but
it is not considered a signiﬁcant problem. According to one local black
entrepreneur: ‘ If you earn more than NAD 1000 a month, it is your
obligation to look after family members and relatives. ’ Others also held
that it is common to look to ‘ the stronger person in the family ’ for help.
However, with improved education, people can maintain themselves and
social obligations mean less : ‘Social obligations are not a main problem
now.’ ‘You can give them easy jobs such as cleaning. ’
Those who were in favour of family labour argued that they are loyal
and do not steal, and that they need a loyal person to take care of the
business when they are away. Their experiences were positive. Those who
argued against, had negative experiences. One local black entrepreneur
looked at it this way: ‘Family members don’t steal, but won’t work either. ’
He had previously employed family labour, but had dismissed them. Yet
another entrepreneur held that family labour is not successful, they both
steal and do not work. One black former panel beater from the South who
had recently moved to the North said that he did so in order to escape
friends and customers who never paid him, and because he did not like to
spend so much on family and relatives.
There was agreement among local black entrepreneurs that family ob-
ligations do not prevent reinvestment. ‘ It is not correct that they only
spend money on family. That was the previous generation’ (old local black
entrepreneur). ‘People are prepared to reinvest and do their business, but
unfortunately some businesses are unviable and go bankrupt ’ (local black
entrepreneur). In one case it was mentioned that one must plough back
60% of the earnings and not take out more than 40% for the family. Most
of the businesses have expanded little by little by savings and reinvestment,
including upgrading and renewal of equipment and expansion. Some
purchase land and invest in buildings for their businesses. A few cannot
aﬀord any of this, and only have operating capital to keep the business
going. One local black entrepreneur considered the enterprise as a way of
life, and subsidised it when necessary with inherited money and income
from other sources.
Some divert into new activities when they experience ﬁerce competition.
Investment in commercial farming is a case in point. It was sometimes
mentioned that ‘big locals shift to commercial farming’ and that ‘ it is a
new phenomenon to take out money and invest in commercial farming’.
Commercial farming, with the exception of a few projects in the North,
takes place in central and southern Namibia. A couple of respondents
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mentioned that their dream was to invest in a commercial farm where they
could stay when they retired. Only three of the local black entrepreneurs in
the sample were involved in commercial farming.One of them experienced
severe competition in wholesale and retail, but had taken up commercial
farming before the downturn. He stressed that ‘a farm is more important
to a man than a shop’. He was also concerned that family and relatives
can stay at the farm. Traditionally, Ovambo men practised cattle herding,
andwomen food collection and cultivation for subsistence. The agricultural
sector, hunting and forestry absorb about 40% of the economically active
population in Oshana, but still mainly at the subsistence level (NDC n.d.).
Although there are elements of cultural embeddedness in the present in-
terest in a ‘return’ or withdrawal to farming,14 the fact that agriculture has
remained a dominant activity for so long is also an economic necessity
resulting from apartheid and the political economy of the country.
To the extent that competition from outside investors stimulates a shift
to commercial farming, this also stimulates the ﬂow of money out of the
area, to the possible detriment of local economic development. Because
few other investment opportunities are attractive to local black en-
trepreneurs in the North, income from commercial farming will at best be
channelled back into some demand in the retail sector that South African
investors dominate. This implies that the surplus trickles out of the North
and out of Namibia. In order for cattle and goat farming to serve as viable
commercial activities and as a source of value-added in the North, a
number of barriers have to be dealt with, including removal of the veter-
inary cordon fence and improved veterinary services and improved mar-
keting (NDC n.d.).
Having discussed forms of cultural embeddedness acting as barriers to
economic development, the next question is how cultural embeddedness
may enhance local business through common understanding and trust.
Relations with the neighbouring countries, Angola and DRC, show how
political, cultural and social embeddedness are intertwined. The cultural
link to Angola is the stronger of the two, as the traditional land of the
Ovambo stretches into the Cunene district of southern Angola, and Angola
supported SWAPO in the struggle for independence in Namibia. More
recently, Namibia sent troops to Congo when President Kabila was under
military threat.
The Namibian government has targeted Angola as a main trade part-
ner (Sparks & Green 1992). Residents and refugees from Angola travel to
northern Namibia and add to the local market. Angolans are popular
customers because they buy in bulk and pay cash in US dollars. At the
moment their major demand is for building materials. According to a
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respondent in wholesale and groceries, they also come for beer, cold drinks
and whisky, but tend to buy foodstuﬀs in bulk from South Africa. However,
Angolans are buying less than before, and – like local black entrepreneurs
in Namibia – increasingly cut out the middlemen and deal directly with
factories in South Africa. To set up a business in Angola was generally
considered risky at the time of the war between the government forces and
insurgents. Two of the black entrepreneurs had to close down their aﬃliates
in the Namibian border town of Oshikongo, due to the unrest and rob-
bery. At the time of the ﬁeldwork, a delegation of Namibian entrepreneurs
planned a business trip to Angola to explore investment opportunities. It is
especially in respect of building contracts that they ﬁnd Angola interest-
ing: ‘There are risks involved and a lot of money to be earned, but there
are also some relatively safe places ’ (interview). An advantage is that
building construction in Angola can be managed from Namibia.
According to one local black entrepreneur, the government wants to
promote business collaboration and trade between Namibia and DRC,
but does not want entrepreneurs ‘ to go and exploit their brothers in
Congo’. High prices can be obtained in DRC due to scarcity of numerous
goods. Only a few of the local black entrepreneurs in the sample go to
DRC on business trips, either in order to buy inputs or to plan for exports.
This interaction is based on acquaintances.
In historical perspective, the cultural and political embeddedness mani-
fested in the ﬁght against apartheid form the core of the relations with
Angola and DRC. This has given rise to personal relations, which facili-
tate interaction today. Those who trade with Angola and DRC belong to
the more successful local black entrepreneurs in the sample. In addition,
local black entrepreneurs, domestic entrepreneurs and chain stores in the
North beneﬁt from Angolan demand in Namibia. The two neighbouring
countries provide markets for those who are already successful in their
businesses, rather that those who are squeezed out of the home market.
Angolan and Congolese customers may boost the business of local black
entrepreneurs in the short term, and probably longer in some niches of
the sewing sector, where the uniqueness of the product is essential, and
it is easier to establish personal relations with customers. However, a
local black entrepreneur who tried to establish a manufacturing unit15
in the North based on technology from DRC, found that the company
he approached in DRC wanted instead to export to Namibia, although
it would be cheaper to manufacture the product in Namibia, and sug-
gested that the local black entrepreneur be their sales agent. DRC policy
is to promote South African investment in key areas such as mining, con-
struction, telecoms, agriculture and agro-processing, energy and tourism.
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South African investors are attractive because they have money and skills,
as well as ‘ the innate understanding of the prevailing conditions on this
continent ’ (Traders 2001: 17) ; they are involved in similar businesses in
Namibia. This shows how diﬃcult it is for Namibians in general and local
black entrepreneurs in particular to rely on external demand in the longer
run,when the internal industrial base is shallow.Moreover, thebusiness elite
in South Africa is white, and retains some scepticism and distrust towards
blacks, which aﬀects the opportunities open to local black entrepreneurs.
S O C I A L E M B E D D E D N E S S: E X T E R N A L O R I E N T A T I O N
Social embeddedess takes place through interpersonal relationships (Zukin
& DiMaggio 1990). Good relationships with suppliers of equipment and
inputs were important to all the local black entrepreneurs. It was common
to have met suppliers in person, even though many had to travel all the
way to South Africa to do so. Social embeddedness in respect of relation-
ships to suppliers is to a large extent externally oriented. Personal meetings
are a means to establish trust. It is easier and safer to order by fax and
telephone when the parties have met each other before. Personal meetings
with the suppliers in order to bargain for credit are not common. In fact,
many entrepreneurs prefer to pay cash in order to get discounts.
Problems of access to information about relevant government regu-
lations were sometimes mentioned. Personal relations with persons in the
political elite are important both to get such information, and to get help to
take advantage of opportunities provided by industrial policy and regu-
lations. For example, the fact that local exporters may seek EPZ status is
not commonly known.
It is clear that the largest entrepreneurs in the region have personal
political connections, but concrete information about their nature and
implications for economic activities was not revealed. Only one of the
entrepreneurs talked about personal political connections. This did not
help her to set up the business in the ﬁrst place, but the status it gave
provided a market opportunity for higher quality products, and members
of the political elite were among her customers. The political elite spends
weekends in the North and goes there for special occasions such as wed-
dings and funerals. Other entrepreneurs expressed frustration or resig-
nation that they did not get help from the politicians. Although personal
connections with politicians may have been downplayed by the re-
spondents, the outcome of such possible relations does not seem to have
been of any signiﬁcant help, given the problems that the entrepreneurs
have to cope with.
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As for personal relationships between entrepreneurs, some black en-
trepreneurs said that they had given business advice, although not money,
to fellow entrepreneurs. However, it was also claimed that ‘people here
are selﬁsh’ and ‘ they do not talk much and they do not co-operate much’.
This is not surprising in the light of the recent war of independence.
People who supported diﬀerent sides and factions during the war may ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to trust each other in business a few years later. In contrast, the
case of six friends who were about to form a joint venture illustrates that it
is possible to build on trust. One of them said that they ‘have come a long
way together ’, and had been friends long before they decided to cooperate
in a joint venture. In another case in the sewing sector, ten small en-
trepreneurs who are located in the same vicinity cooperate. Eight of the ten
are so small that they are not registered. One of the registered entrepre-
neurs assists the others with designs and cutting, and helps them to contact
suppliers she has conﬁdence in, and to draw up business plans. This is
important, because small entrepreneurs are reluctant to attend workshops,
and prefer to be taught one by one, by a person whom they know.
Not all of the local black entrepreneurs were members of the Northern
branch of NCCI. The most common argument among non-members was
that they had not been directly approached by the organisation. A few
mentioned that they felt they were too new in the business to join, and one
argued that it would not help him very much because ‘ the large do not
want to share ideas with the small ’. The local annual trade fair that NCCI
arranges for business people to meet and promote economic activity in the
region was very popular, with over 350 exhibits in 2001. The Northern
branch of NCCI is in practice predominantly an organisation for local
black entrepreneurs. Local aﬃliates of ﬁrms in Windhoek are registered
with the Windhoek branch of the NCCI, and do not engage in the ac-
tivities of the Northern branch, even though local aﬃliates are supposed to
register at the local branch. A few white investors belong to the Northern
branch, but some black members regard this with suspicion. Some of the
white investors believe that the Northern branch of NCCI is more for the
smaller entrepreneurs who are in need of business training. Although rules
have changed on paper, changes in practice take time. Scepticism is due to
the history of apartheid and the dominant economic power of potential
white members, which cannot yet be balanced by black political embed-
dedness. However, there exists a local ladies’ business group with both
black and white participants who meet regularly.
In one case, a local black entrepreneur received credit and business
training from a South African company, and took over a retail grocery
that belonged to it. The company is still involved in both wholesale and
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retail. He explained that he is given credit and business advice because the
more he sells, the more he buys from them and the more they earn. This
entrepreneur believes that the South African company is going to withdraw
from retail, but this is not veriﬁed by a respondent in the company.16 The
shop is situated in a locality with severe competition from other shops, and
so the role as a mere supplier to the local black entrepreneur may be less
risky and more economical to the South African company. Another local
black entrepreneur has white business advisors and is claimed to be suc-
cessful partly because he copies the business strategies of the chain stores.
Black-white interaction at this level is the exception rather than the rule.
White entrepreneurs and managers of chain stores do not totally lack
local social embeddedness. Some have lived in the North for several years,
some plan to remain and there are examples of involvement in local de-
velopment initiatives. However, their enterprises belong more to Wind-
hoek and South Africa-based networks. Personal relations between black
and white exist, but are not very common.
P R O S P E C T S F O R M A N U F A C T U R I N G
Fourteen of the local black entrepreneurs in the sample were involved in
some kind of manufacturing. The sewing sector produces wedding gowns,
other clothing, linen and curtains. Some entrepreneurs make furniture
and coﬃns. In the grocery sector one ﬁnds food processing such as sugar
reﬁning, mixing of vinegar and milling. Auto repairs are sometimes com-
bined with welding, manufacture of steel car parts, and even ploughs.
Production of bricks and tiles, and printing of cards and T-shirts also take
place. Mostly the operations are small scale and cater to local niche mar-
kets with relatively simple products, and they are also often a side activity.
Sales at the upper end of the market are the exception rather than the rule.
Some manufacturers planned to expand production step by step, but there
was little interest in initiating new manufacturing projects. They found it
diﬃcult to identify products that it would be economically feasible to
manufacture in the North. Diﬃculties in getting bank loans and lack of
information and training were also mentioned as constraints to manufac-
turing. Based on negative personal experiences, one local black en-
trepreneur suspected that good business ideas were stolen by consultants
and potential partners, and initiated in the southern part of the country.17
The small size of the local market and imports from South Africa were
also mentioned as constraints. South Africa is the main export market and
Namibian product standards are still based on South African standards.
One entrepreneur complained that it was diﬃcult to fulﬁl ‘ the South
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African requirements ’. In practice, the standards may require that a
speciﬁc South African input is used. ‘The government says that changes
are in the pipeline – they are still in the pipeline after 11 years ’ (local black
entrepreneur). Even at present the entrepreneur struggles to get an input
he needs from South Africa in order to start his manufacturing project. To
his mind, this shows that South African standards prevent manufacture
of products in Namibia that compete with South African products. The
Small Business Information Centre in Windhoek stresses that sourcing
from South Africa is more than a matter of product standards. Quality,
range and price competition are important reasons for sourcing (personal
communication). As noted above, in the longer term the internet may
foster purchases of inputs in other countries and so weaken the South
African monopoly, which acts as a barrier to manufacturing. Although
this implies some changes in the facilitative circuit of power, it is not suf-
ﬁcient to spur manufacturing on a large scale in Namibia. Competition
from products made in South Africa will still be strong.
The strong structural barriers against manufacturing in the North, such
as the size of the Namibian market and unequal competition with South
Africa, explain why the power of domestic and foreign retailers whose
networks are basically embedded in South Africa is strong. Moreover, the
footing of powerful actors in the local retail economy who have their
supply base in South Africa does not encourage local manufacturing on
any scale. Nor does lack of trust in relations with business partners, banks
and the local administration encourage this. The risk of failure is too great.
The limited manufacturing that takes place in the North at present is
small and largely of the artisan and workshop type. The activities are
important in terms of livelihood and provide employment, but due to the
overall constraints they are unlikely to generate a process of sustained
industrialisation in the foreseeable future.
P R O S P E C T S F O R E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T
One local black entrepreneur observed that : ‘development is coming in,
but mostly from the outside. There is growth, but the income is going out
again. ’ This puts the problem in a nutshell. A lot of the economic activity
is induced from outside with the decentralisation policy and the inﬂux of
South African chain stores. This policy generates both permanent jobs in
the civil service and temporary jobs in construction. However, only 16%
of the economically active population in Oshana are employed in whole-
sale, retail and repair, and only 9% in public administration and defence
(NDC n.d.).18
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Almost all of the interviewees agreed that total economic activity and
consumption in the North has increased since independence and par-
ticularly since the mid-1990s. But despite the retail boom, it is doubtful
whether this contributes a positive net eﬀect to employment. The chain
stores out-compete the local stores and employ fewer workers, although
they pay their workers better than the local stores.
Unfortunately the general pattern is that increases in consumption
imply increasing imports rather than local production. As already
mentioned, the part of the value chain that is located in the study area
is short, and networks are largely outward-oriented. There are no par-
ticular signs that the North is becoming important enough to foreign en-
terprises for them to reinvest and create new linkages in the local economy
in order to obtain a solid footing. On the contrary, the direct link to South
Africa has increased in importance, because tough price competition re-
quires ‘everybody’ to have direct access to the suppliers. Not even the
smaller local black entrepreneurs in sales and workshops need the local
big entrepreneurs as middlemen to the same degree as before. Moreover,
both local black entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs from outside are in-
creasingly aware of the fact that the market is not big enough for all of the
retailers.
Pendleton et al.’s (1993) study of socio-economic conditions of 520
households in the Oshakati-Ondangwa nexus showed that half of the
adult population and half of the households in their survey were un-
employed. The mean annual income was Rand 9,754, but variations in
income were large. The mode was Rand 3,600 and the median was
Rand 4,786.19 A survey carried out in Oshakati in 2000 found that 17%
of the households had no income at all, and that one third of households
earned less than NAD 725 a month, or NAD 8,700 annually. The average
household size was 5.2 persons, and this income was less than that
considered necessary to pay for services such as water and sanitation
(Urban Dynamics 2001).20 Namibia Development Consultants (n.d.)
hold that the average annual household income in Oshana is NAD
10,528, and that more than 40% of the households in the region are
‘aﬀected by poverty’.21 The average national income is NAD 17,189.
Although the ﬁgures are not directly comparable and should be treated
with caution, they indicate that the prospects for sustained economic
development in the North are still small. Conditions at present do not
seem to contribute to a diﬀerentiated and well-proportioned local
economy.
: : :
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Local black entrepreneurs are more locally embedded than domestic and
foreign capital, but the diﬀerence is less than expected. The value chains
and networks of all three capitals are ﬁrst and foremost directed towards
South Africa. Local black entrepreneurs and some domestic entrepreneurs
are however more prone to reinvest locally than South African chain
stores. When out-competed in their main line of business, the problem is
for local black entrepreneurs to identify alternative activities for viable and
productive new investments.
The political elite has strong ties to the North, but the political em-
beddedness of local black entrepreneurs is also less than expected. Despite
special measures to support local black entrepreneurs in the area of credit
and access to government tenders, the outcome is relatively meagre. It is
still diﬃcult to obtain both, and the measures are not suﬃcient for most
local black entrepreneurs to withstand the strong competition from large
companies that the free trade policy opens up. Market-based incentives of
the decentralisation policy also favour the stronger parties, who are mainly
from southern Namibia or South Africa, where economic power rests with
the white business elite.
Some aspects of cultural embeddedness, such as social obligations and
conspicuous consumption to an extent that may undermine the business,
have diminished. There is a gradual shift to more modern business prac-
tices. Local black entrepreneurs are concerned that their businesses should
not die with them, and are shifting from the traditional system of inherit-
ance to joint ventures and wills. The entrepreneurs do reinvest. It is im-
pressive what has been achieved by small amounts of capital step by step
over a number of years. The present problem is the vulnerability of these
undertakings to competition from large and capital-strong actors from
outside.
Common culture and political cooperation with the neighbouring
countries, Angola and DRC, provide few signiﬁcant alternative market
outlets for local black entrepreneurs. However, they beneﬁt some local
black entrepreneurs in niche activities who have strong personal relations
there. The problem is the extreme outward-oriented economy of Namibia
and the lack of manufacturing. This makes it more attractive for the
neighbouring countries to deal directly with producers in South Africa.
Social embeddedness is strikingly outward-oriented, because most sup-
pliers are located in South Africa and Windhoek. There are signs that lack
of trust reduces the scope of social embeddedness for local black en-
trepreneurs in the North. Moreover, black and white entrepreneurs and
investors are mainly embedded in separate social networks. Increasing
marginalisation of the local black entrepreneurs in competition may
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increase frustration and suspicion and thus accentuate the black–white
divide.
In studies of local economic development, an analytical framework that
combines value chains analysis and the notion of political, cultural and
social embeddedness is useful. The notion of value chains describes the
activities that are interlinked in the economic networks. This is important
as some activities are more beneﬁcial to economic development than
others. The activities that presently dominate in the North, civil service,
construction and trade, are unlikely to become vehicles of economic de-
velopment. Tough price competition and low levels of income are in-
compatible with demand-induced economic development.
Social relations, as in political, cultural and social embeddedness, entail
power relations that inﬂuence what activities are located where. The
ﬁndings challenge the proposition that the more locally embedded an
economic activity is, the more conducive it is to economic development. It
is not suﬃcient to focus on the degree of local embeddedness, because
some forms of local embeddedness, such as social obligations, may also
impede economic development. However, in this case, the data suggest
that expenditure on social obligations to the detriment of reinvestment
in economic enterprises is diminishing in the North. To the extent that
the tough competition from outside results in a withdrawal to farming, this
also impedes local economic development. Themagnitude of this phenom-
enon warrants further research. Having said all this, and as the nature of
power relations reveal, it is not local cultural embeddedness as such, but
the economic dominance and competition from South Africa, that is the
main impediment to economic development in Northern Namibia. Local
political embeddedness is shallow and political measures are not taken that
signiﬁcantly reduce the implications of this dominance.
N O T E S
1. Information obtained in November 1998 in an interview at Chamber of Commerce and Industry
and Small Scale Business Development, Northern Namibia Region.
2. Social development, on the other hand, is measured by such indicators as life expectancy, nu-
tritional standards and educational standards, which reﬂect how people are aﬀected by economic
development, positively or negatively (Hesselberg 1985). Social development lies beyond the scope of
this project.
3. See Gereﬃ 1996, Gereﬃ et al. 2001, and Sturgeon 2001.
4. These are in turn manifestations of superstructure (the social, cultural, political and spatial or-
ganisation of society), which in turn can be explained by infrastructure ( Johnston 1997). Infrastructure
refers to economic processes and the material base to society. Human agency may aﬀect the structures.
5. The concept of cognitive embeddedness deals with the fact that rationality based on a full view of
a situation is limited.
6. Here place refers to the fact that power relations in a location are shaped by place-speciﬁc
conditions. Space refers to the fact that events in one place may aﬀect power relationships in other
places.
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7. Micro enterprises and enterprises in the informal sector were not included in this study. The
larger of the small entrepreneurs use electricity, and the Electricity Board was willing to give us access
to their lists. This was a good starting point for the identiﬁcation of potential respondents. The tele-
phone directory was less up-to-date, but we could possibly have obtained similar lists of entrepreneurs
from the Town Council.
8. The bantustan policy was pursued in the period 1948–77.
9. The exception is when rights over national resources are involved.
10. NAD 1=USD 0.12 ( June 2003).
11. With South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana.
12. The objective of the decentralisation policy is to decentralise power to enhance and guarantee
participatory democracy and ensure rapid sustainable development.
13. Although white males are still overrepresented in management positions and aﬃrmative action
did not put an end to their appointments and promotions, black males are its main beneﬁciaries
( Jauch 1998).
14. Many respondents talked about a ‘return’ or withdrawal to farming as a new trend, but few of
them were involved in this or had concrete plans to do so themselves. The idea of such a ‘return’ or
withdrawal is interesting in its own right, because it tells something about the diﬃcult economic
conditions that black entrepreneurs face in the North. A quantitative study is needed to examine the
extent of the phenomenon.
15. In order for him to remain anonymous and to keep the business idea a secret, I had to promise
not to mention what type of manufacturing.
16. The respondent was a local employee who was told by the foreign management to answer our
questions. She was very careful about what she said throughout the interview.
17. This has not been further examined.
18. The NDC population ﬁgures are based on the May 2000 projections of the Central Bureau of
Statistics.
19. As mentioned in the text above, Rand and NAD have been freely interchangeable since 1993.
20. The income data are from a survey carried out by Urban Dynamics in April 2000 which
underlies their Structure Plan of 2001. The year referred to is not explicitly mentioned, but is probably
1999.
21. The concept of poverty is not deﬁned in the report.
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